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PaRTAA: A Real-time Multiprocessor for
Mixed-Criticality Airborne Systems
Shibarchi Majumder Member, IEEE, Jens F D Nielsen and Thomas Bak Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Mixed-criticality systems, where multiple systems with varying criticality-levels share a single hardware platform, require
isolation between tasks with different criticality-levels. Isolation can be achieved with software-based solutions or can be enforced by a
hardware level partitioning. An asymmetric multiprocessor architecture offers hardware-based isolation at the cost of underutilized
hardware resources, and the inter-core communication mechanism is often a single point of failure in such architectures. In contrast, a
partitioned uniprocessor offers efficient resource utilization at the cost of limited scalability.
We propose a partitioned real-time asymmetric architecture (PaRTAA) specifically designed for mixed-criticality airborne systems,
featuring robust partitioning within processing elements for establishing isolation between tasks with varying criticality. The granularity
in the processing element offers efficient resource utilization where inter-dependent tasks share the same processing element for
sequential execution while preserving isolation, and independent tasks simultaneously execute on different processing elements as per
system requirements.
Index Terms—Avionics on Multi-core, Mixed-criticality Systems, Integrated Modular Avionics, Robust Resource Partitioning, Single
Core Equivalence, Processor Architecture.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
M IXED-CRITICALITY systems, where multiple subsys-tems of different criticality-levels share the same
platform, require isolation between subsystems with dif-
ferent criticality-levels to prevent interference that can be
addressed by a software-based mechanism such as an op-
erating system or a hypervisor, or can be established at the
hardware level. Driven by the certification requirements in
safety-critical systems, for e.g., RTCA DO-297 [1] for airborne
platforms, the isolation mechanism shall meet the certifica-
tion requirements of the subsystem with highest criticality-
level to be implemented on the platform. Such requirements
result in expensive software-based isolation mechanisms
and thus enhance the scope of hardware-based isolation.
Single-core-equivalent-multicore (SCE) [2], an asymmetric
multiprocessor (AMP) architecture with multi or many iso-
lated processors with dedicated resources, interconnected
over a network-on-chip (NoC), offers isolation between tasks
running on separate processors. Such an architecture has the
potential to meet mixed-criticality requirements for safety-
critical airborne platforms where each subsystem can exe-
cute on a dedicated processing element without any interfer-
ence from other subsystems. Moreover, an SCE architecture
is beneficial over a symmetric multiprocessing architecture
in terms of re-usability of existing source-code that avails
a more practical and economic transition to multicore for
the aerospace industry. However, in SCE architecture, the
NoC or inter-core communication system is a bottleneck
and often a single point of failure that requires redundancy
or additional safety-net mechanism. Additionally, a one-to-
one mapping of individual integrated modular avionics (IMA)
[1] application to AMP processors increases the bandwidth
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requirement resulting in resource-extensive NoC architec-
ture and adds to the complexity of system scheduling due
to inter-core communication delays over the NoC. Further-
more, dedicating a core to a subsystem is not efficient in
terms of resource utilization; large airborne platforms may
afford many-core platforms with hundreds of cores, but
that may not be feasible for resource limited platforms like
unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
Alternatively, a single-core architecture with a hardware-
level isolation mechanism can offer better computational
resource utilization with a small hardware footprint. How-
ever, a partitioned single-core architecture may not be suf-
ficient to address the growing demand for computational
resources with an increasing degree of autonomous flight
capabilities.
The SCE architecture offers an excellent solution for
parallel execution at the cost of under-utilized resources
where a partitioned architecture provides sequential access
to a single processing element resulting in efficient resource
utilization. Aerospace systems have limited scope of parallel
execution as some systems may have inter-system depen-
dencies and must be executed sequentially, and mutually
independent systems can be executed simultaneously.
In this work, we propose a partitioned real-time asym-
metric architecture PaRTAA, where individual processing
elements featuring robust resource partitioning are inter-
connected with a time predictable NoC to provide a time
analyzable resource-partitioned distributed architecture, as
shown in Figure 1. The partitions within processing el-
ements satisfy isolation requirements for mixed-criticality
systems; sequential tasks can execute on the same or differ-
ent partitions depending on its criticality-level on the same
processor, and independent tasks/ systems can execute si-
multaneously on separate processors, resulting in efficient
resource utilization.
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Fig. 1. A block diagram of the proposed multiprocessor architecture
PaRTAA with four processors. Each processor has three underlying
partitions with dedicated resources and protected memories (PM). All
the partitions are interconnected over a NoC via network interfaces(NI)
memory mapped (MM) to the protected memory region.
In our previous work, we proposed a coarse-grained
uniprocessor, featuring hardware-level partitioning for iso-
lation [3]. In another work, we introduced a network-on-
chip that offers time analyzability and end-to-end isolation
between data packets [4] for mixed-criticality systems. In
this work, we have extended our previous works to pro-
pose a multiprocessor architecture featuring hardware-level
robust resource partitioning. The specific contribution of this
paper includes -
• A time-predictable multiprocessor architecture fea-
turing robust resource partitioning to accommodate
systems with mixed-criticality while preventing in-
terference.
• A multiprocessor architecture with coarse-grained
processing elements for efficient resource utilization
by combining sequential and parallel execution de-
pending upon system requirements.
• The architecture preserves the reusability of software
solutions in airborne systems developed for single-
core platforms.
• A globally visible processor flag mechanism for task
synchronization under different partitions and pro-
cessors.
• A demonstration of the proposed architecture for an
avionics use case.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The scope of multicore architecture in airborne systems is
still evolving. However, several researchers have addressed
multicore architectures for real-time and safety-critical ap-
plications. This section discusses related architectures in the
context of mixed-criticality airborne systems.
2.1 Mixed-Criticality and IMA
Driven by the constraints of space, weight and power,
mixed-criticality systems allow systems with different
criticality-levels to share the same host hardware when
inter-system interference is mitigated. In airborne systems,
to replace federated avionics architecture, a line replaceable
unit (LRU) based framework where a single LRU is certified
to a single DO-178B [5] and/ or DO-254 [6] level, the
concept of mixed-criticality system is adopted as IMA [1],
where systems with different level of criticality defined as
design assurance level (DAL) A, B, C, D and E [5], [7] can
share the same host platform. To establish isolation between
systems with different criticality-levels, the guidelines for
robust resource partitioning (RRP) [8] is adopted from DO-
248C [9] and DO-297 [1].
RRP is achieved when: 1) partitions cannot contaminate
instructions, I/O, and data of other partitions, 2) partitions
cannot use resource outside its allocated resources and 3)
dysfunction/ failure in one partition cannot cause adverse
effect on other partitions [8].
In practice, IMA system software is separated from the
host platform by an application executive (APEX), an appli-
cation programming interface (API) defined in ARINC 653
[10] standard for IMA partitioning. The ARINC 653 API is
independent from the base hardware platform and a given
software host environment or operating system implemen-
tation. The hardware-software isolation allows incremental
certification, thus, modification in systems can be certified
by certifying only the changes.
2.2 Related Processor Architecture
Currently, Federation Aviation Administration (FAA) guide-
lines do not include the use of commercial off the shelf
(COTS) microprocessors and system-on-chips (SoCs) in air-
borne system, however, the scope is under evaluation [11]
[12]. Furthermore, FAA restricts the use to only one active
core in a multicore platform due to potential inter-core
interference [8].
According to a recent position paper on multicore pro-
cessors (MCP) for airborne systems [8], the applicant should
identify all potential interference paths on an MCP for DAL
level A and level B applications. When implemented on
an MCP platform without a robust partitioning, software
components or sets of requirements for which interference
paths are not avoided or mitigated shall be verified with
all other software components executing all together [8].
However, for MCP platforms with established robust par-
titioning, software components can be verified separately,
including determination of worst case execution time (WCET)
[8].
The concept of interconnecting multiple partitioned pro-
cessors to form a distributed partitioned system was pro-
posed in a paper by NASA in 2000 [13]. The architecture
was found to be challenging due to requirements of point-
to-point communication mechanism for inter-partition com-
munication that cannot be achieved with shared bus. How-
ever, the feasibility of such an architecture with a data-
concentrator unit to hold partition specific data was re-
alized. In our approach, the proposed NoC architecture
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features similar dedicated sampling buffer to hold partition
specific data without interrupting executing partitions.
The idea of mapping RTOS functionalities to hardware
is not new. In FASTCHART [14], the authors have achieved
time deterministic execution with 64 different tasks with 8
different priorities with a RISC architecture by removing
cache and pipeline. Adomat et al., in [15] demonstrated
a real-time hardware kernel that can support a similar
number of tasks and priorities like FASTCHART, but with
additional hardware features. Ungerer et al. [16], intro-
duced a worst-case time-analyzable multicore architecture
for mixed-criticality system with isolation between tasks,
although, the architecture is limited to a single hard real-
time task per core.
In recent years, Zimmer et al. [17] has introduced Flex-
PRET, a fine-grained multi-threaded processor architecture
for mixed-criticality systems. The work, demonstrates a
WCET analyzable framework that features isolation in tem-
poral and spatial domain without wasting computational
cycles. Tasks are segregated in threads and each thread is
given access to the computational resources for a single
clock cycle in a fixed or active round-robin arbitration rou-
tine. A very similar architecture [18] by Liu et al., PTARM, is
a fine-grained multi-threaded architecture with fixed-round-
robin arbitration among four threads. The architecture avails
hard real-time execution time at a cost of wasted cycles
when all the threads are not active. Another similar ar-
chitecture XMOS [19], poses better utilization of resources
by excluding inactive tasks from the scheduling. WCET is
analyzed by considering the maximum number of active
tasks at any given time. Delvai et al. [20], introduced a 16-bit,
3 stage processor, SPEAR, with repeatable-time instructions
by single path execution flow.
Apart from the partitioned uniprocessor architectures,
there are several multiprocessor architectures proposed for
generic mixed-criticality systems. Salloum et al. in [21], has
proposed and demonstrated a multiprocessor system on
chip (MPSoC) solution that focus on easing the certification
process required in safety-critical domain. MultiPARTES
project [22] demonstrates a multi-core heterogeneous archi-
tecture and focus on associated tool-chains for easing the
certification process for mixed-criticality systems on a multi-
core syste. The researchers in [23], describe a system archi-
tecture that enables the use of data-centric distribution mid-
dleware in partitioned real-time embedded systems based
on a hypervisor for multi-core focused on the analysis of
the available architectural configurations. For more related
work on mixed-criticality system on multiprocessor, please
consider the report by Baruah et al. [24] that summarizes
a broad spectrum of researches related to multi-core and
many-core architectures in the context of mixed-criticality
implementation.
2.3 Inter-Core Communication
Several NoC architectures have been demonstrated for
safety critical systems. The use of NoC in a real-time system
imposes complex constraints in the overall design [25].
In SoCBUS [26], a circuit switching method is applied and
a concept called packet connected circuit was introduced,
where a data packet propagates through a dynamic mini-
mum route, locking the circuit as it moves through the net-
work. For such switching mechanism, a real-time analysis
is possible when the traffic follows a fixed schedule, but
not effective where the transmission sequence is not fixed
like in avionics systems, where the data sequence depend
on the relative state of the applications. In Xpipes [27], the
network is tailored to meet the bandwidth requirements
of the payload application at its design stage. In practice,
such a system could be hard to fabricate as foreseeing the
exact communication load is difficult to analyze, and it
restricts reusability and the scope of future modification
of the system. An alternative solution is proposed based
on backtrack probing to avoid waiting for blocked channels
to become available, seeking for alternative non-minimal
routes in [28]. However, such a solution does not guarantee
time-predictability. In [29], a synchronous circuit switching
NoC is presented. A concept of spatial division multiplexing
is introduced, where the physical channel is segmented to
provide physical separation between data streams at a cost
of elevated resources.
A connection-less packet-switching approach is demon-
strated in [30], where the routers work independently and a
wormhole switching technique is used. The transmissions are
prioritized based on some fixed parameters and transmis-
sion with the highest priority is given preference. The draw-
back of such a design is that packets with low priorities
may be dropped or stalled for a long time and has a longer
latency resulting in an unachievable time-analyzability. The
authors propose a low end-to-end latency with a guar-
anteed service traffic in [31]. In [32], [33], the researchers
have addressed the low priority packet blocking problem
in a connection-less NoC by introducing the concept of
increasing priority over waiting time. In contrast, this work
offers a mixed, best-effort and guaranteed-service traffic where
transmission with highest priority is given preference by
allocating more bandwidth, while transmission with lower
priority is given the minimum bandwidth allocated by
the system designer to maintain worst-case-time analyzable
communication for transmissions belonging to all priorities.
2.4 Multiprocessor in Avionics
System certification with multicore platform is presently
challenging due to lack of guidelines and formal methods
issued by certification authorities. The EASA research re-
port [34] and FAA position paper [8] are the most recent
studies available from a certification authority on the po-
tential scope and regulations on multicore platforms for
airborne systems. Although, CAST 32A position paper [8]
only includes multicore platforms with only two core and
excludes any asymmetric multiprocessors with no shared
memory/ cache or coherency module [8], SCE architectures
are found to be beneficial for mixed-criticality and IMA
implementations [2]. One major benefit of SCE is reusability
of source code developed for single core architecture.
A few AMP and many-core architectures have been
demonstrated for IMA implementation. In [35], a helicopter
health monitoring system is demonstrated on a many-core
processor architecture for exploiting computing capabilities
and timing responses. The researchers have used the Kalray
MMPA-256 platform, that features dedicated memory banks
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Fig. 2. A high level diagram showing the Ærø processor architecture and pipeline stages with three partitions. Note that the data path and control
path are specified with different arrows.
for processing elements and a reservation mechanism on the
NoC. In [36], the authors have proposed a time predictable
asymmetric multicore architecture with dual issue real-time
processors connected over a time-predictable bi-torus NoC.
Finally, a platform with 4 processors has been demonstrated
for an avionics application in [37], where each processor
hosts a single sub-system of a helicopter health monitoring
system.
3 THE PROCESSOR
The proposed multiprocessor architecture is an adoption
and extension of our previous work on a uniprocessor, Ærø
[3], and we will briefly discuss the essential parts that are
required for understanding, and focus on the extensions
made in this work.
Ærø is a coarse-grained time analyzable processor with
a 32-bit RISC style custom ISA and four pipeline stages;
instruction fetch (F), decode (D), execute (E), memory-access
(M) as shown in Figure 2. Ærø is statically scheduled, and
all delays are analyzable in the instruction set for a single
path execution paradigm.
In this work, to fabricate an asymmetric multiprocssor,
we have integrated four Ærø processors, interfaced with
a time-predictable NoC, as illustrated in Figure 1. The
goal is, a set of tasks of mixed-criticality levels can be
scheduled on different partitions under different processors
depending on the timing requirements and criticality-level,
and the hardware-defined partitioning will feature isolation
between tasks with different criticality-levels without any
host software support. Please note that the proposed AMP
architecture is scalable, and can be fabricated with more
processors. That is one of the reasons for considering a NoC
instead of an on-chip bus for inter-processor communica-
tion.
3.1 Architecture and Partitioning
The Ærø processor features hardware-level partitioning to
avail isolation between tasks of different criticality-levels in
either temporal or spatial domain. Isolation in the spatial
domain is achieved with replicated resources, and isolation
in the temporal domain is achieved with a partition switch-
ing mechanism, Switching-Control-Unit (SwCU).
The Ærø offers three partitions to accommodate tasks
with three criticality-levels. Each partition has a parallel data
and control lines with dedicated and replicated resources
connected over a multiplexer. Partitioning is a feature built
within the processor, and the ISA has no access to it. Fur-
thermore, the instructions have no sense of the partitioning
or the partition it is executing within. All the partitions
are identical, and any partition can be used to execute
instructions of any level of criticality.
As the instruction memory is read-only, a shared mem-
ory device can be used to store instructions/ tasks be-
longing to different criticality-levels. However, once the
instruction is fetched, isolation must be maintained (either
in the temporal or spatial domain) through the pipeline
flow to prevent interference. To feature isolation in data and
control flow, parts of the control path and data path contains
parallel paths connected over a multiplexer. At any point of
operation, only a single path is activated by the SwCU.
The SwCU is an inbuilt hardware that enforces a cycle-
accurate time-triggered arbitration mechanism to imple-
ment a fixed scheduling configured by the system designer
for each partition. The SwCU cannot be reached by the tasks
within the processor.
It is possible to configure different execution period and
execution time for each partition in the SwCu, however, to
facilitate time predictable execution the following assump-
tions are made -
• All partitions are periodic.
• All switching events are time-triggered.
• All partitions have uniform priority.
Note that uniform priority suggests that any two partitions
shall never compete for execution access and not partitions
with same criticality.
When a partition is active, only the associated dedicated
resources (control registers, register bank, and paths) are
active, and the instruction flow takes place similar to a non-
partitioned processor. When the active partition completes
execution access time assigned by the user, the partition is
switched, and the next partition (based on partition sched-
ule) is given execution access. All the data and instruction
from the inactive partition remain frozen in the respective
pipeline/ hardware components (e.g., register banks).
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3.2 Memory Hierarchy
We have used three types of memories; instruction memory,
data memory, and stack memory. The instruction memory is
read-only memory for the processor, and instructions from
different partitions can share the same memory device. We
have assumed that all the instructions are present in the
instruction memory, and cache misses are out of the scope
of this work.
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Fig. 3. Block diagram showing the memory control unit and distribution
of data memory in a single processing element.
The partitions must have read/ write access to the data
memory and stack memory for operation, and isolation
must be implemented. However, as at any point in time,
only a single partition is active, a shared memory device
can be used when an isolation mechanism is implemented.
A memory-control-unit (MCU) establishes such an isolation
by partitioning the memory in four segments as shown in
Figure 3. Three segments are dedicated to three partitions,
and one segment is shared between all three partitions. The
partition specific protected memory segment is used as data
memory and stack memory. The shared memory can be used
for sharing data between partitions.
The MCU is a hardware-defined mechanism that con-
trols two most-significant-bits (MSB) of the memory ad-
dress based on the active partition. If the address space
of the memory device is n-bit, then the MCU controls the
[n−1, n−2] -bits of the address space. The memory address
space visible to each partition is n − 1-bit, i.e., an address
space of [n − 2, 0]-bits. However, the n − 2th bit is used to
denote the dedicated or shared memory region.
The instructions within a partition have no notion of the
MCU or the memory segmentation, and the instructions
can only select between shared or protected memory region
for reading or writing operations. The MCU implements
the following logic in hardware:
if (addr[n-2] == 1):
addr[n-1:n-2] = active-partition-flag;
elseif (addr[n-2] == 0):
addr[n-1:n-2] = 2b00;
The partition specific dedicated stack is defined on the
lower end (except the base address) of the dedicated data
memory, and operated by the second access channel of a
dual-port memory device. The stack output is set to the most
recent return address as default.
At any point of operation, there is only one partition
active in a processor; hence, no simultaneous read-write
protection is required. However, the shared memory region
does not offer any hardware-based protection mechanism,
and must have software-based memory protection, e.g.,
mutex.
3.3 I/O and Peripherals
The partitioning in the processor does not have any spe-
cific requirements for IO interfacing. However, to meet
the isolation requirements for mixed-criticality applications,
some specific adjustments are necessary. Each partition
can be interfaced with external I/O devices with standard
memory-mapping technique. The I/Os that require isolation
is mapped to the protected data memory address space
and can only be accessed by the associated partition, and
the shared I/Os or peripherals are mapped in the shared
address space.
For broadcasting the execution state within a partition,
a custom processor flag mechanism is implemented. The
32-bit processor flag accommodates a 2-bit flag that shows
the active partition followed by three 10-bit flags from three
partitions. The 10-bit flagging mechanism can be used as
1023 customs user-defined flags. The base address of the
protected memory region associated with each partition
is used to set the flag with a standard memory writing
technique, and an underlying hardware mechanism slices
the written data and forwards the 10-LSBs, as shown in
Figure 3. The processor flags are mapped on the shared
data memory space, as presented in Table 1. The 10-bit
partition flag can only be set from the associated partition by
accessing the mapped address in the protected data memory
region, and all the processor flags can be read by reading the
address mapped in the shared address space, as shown in
Figure 3. The flagging mechanism can be used for execution
synchronization, and explained later.
Additionally, the proposed multicore architecture fea-
tures a global hardware clock accurate to the processor clock
cycle. The 64-bit counter is mapped to the base address
of the shared memory region. Note that the 64-bit counter
has an extremely long cycle time and cannot virtually reset
withing runtime. The Table 1 shows the assistive hardware
components mapped in the shared memory region. The
memory distribution and memory-mapped I/O interfacing
are presented in Figure 3.
4 INTER-CORE COMMUNICATION
Inter-processor connectivity is the basis of asymmetric mul-
tiprocessors. For mixed-criticality airborne systems, such
an inter-processor communication mechanism must pro-
vide time-predictability for real-time applications as well
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TABLE 1
Mapping of assistive hardwares in the shared address space.
Memory-mapped address attachments
0x00 clock_L (low-bits)
0x04 clock_H (high-bits)
0x08 Processor_1_flags (32-bit)
0x12 Processor_2_flags (32-bit)
0x16 Processor_3_flags (32-bit)
0x20 Processor_4_flags (32-bit)
as satisfy isolation between data from tasks with different
criticality-levels. To interconnect four processors, we have
implemented a time predictable NoC [4] that offers isola-
tion, either in spatial or in the temporal domain, between
data-packets through the entire propagation path as well
as it avails data protection from erroneous transmission
conducted by potential erroneous systems.
For easy monitoring and control of network traffic and
simpler interfacing, we adopted a hybrid of star and tree
topologies. The network is built around a hub, interfaced
with multiple routers in a star topology and each router is
attached to a single or multiple network-interfaces (NI) in a
reverse tree topology as shown in Figure 4.
Tx buffer ch id
Rx buffer(s)Network Interface
Processor 1
MM_addr
NIRouter
Tx buffer ch id
Rx buffer(s)Network Interface
Processor 2
MM_addr
NI Router
Hub
Back end
Front end Memory mapped interface
Rx buffer(s) Rx buffer(s)
Fig. 4. Block diagram showing end-to-end data packet transmission.
Further, to enforce best-effort and guaranteed-service traffic
without any packet loss under normal operation, a mixed
arbitration scheme of time-division multiplexing(TDM) and
dynamic-priority-token-passing is proposed.
The proposed arbitration mechanism accommodates dif-
ferent latency and bandwidth requirements of different pro-
ducers/ consumers in the same network while preserving
time analyzable end-to-end communication.
4.1 Interfacing and Propagation
In PaRTAA, the NoC is configured with four routers, and
three NIs connected to each router, as shown in Figure 1. The
NI has two ends; front-end, to interface with the producer/
consumer and back-end, to interface with the associated
router. An NI is independently interfaced with each parti-
tion using a standard memory-mapping technique, mapped
to the protected memory space of the associated partition.
Each NI has a dedicated sampling buffer for each recep-
tion channel, and each sampling buffer can be separately
mapped to the associated partition. However, as a partition
can only send a single packet at any point, the NI features a
single transmission buffer mapped to the dedicated address
space.
Each partition has a dedicated NI with sampling buffers
that protect the received data until consumed by the par-
tition, even if the partition does not have execution access
at the time of data reception. A producer can send a data
packet any time irrespective of the state of the consumer
partition (active or inactive). The data-packet scheduling
considers the number of transmission per unit time, but the
exact time of transmission is not fixed, and a producer can
push a data packet at any time. A transmission agreement is
only violated if the transmission rate exceeds the bandwidth
assigned to the channel.
There is no direct memory access (DMA) used in the
network, and the producer pushes a data-packet in the
network by writing the data-packet into the NI. The NI
features a transmission sample buffer to temporarily hold
the newly written data-packet for one clock cycle. In the
subsequent clock cycle, the data packet is forwarded to the
router, packed with the destination address in its header. As
the producer can only write a single data-packet at a time,
and the delay between two subsequent writes is more than
two clock cycles, temporal isolation between transmission
packets is achieved.
At the receiving NI end, a dedicated sampling buffer is
featured for each channel to store received data packets. The
channel-specific dedicated sampling buffers establish spatial
isolation between data-packets from different channels.
If the production rate is higher than the consumption
rate, the old data-packet gets overwritten by a fresh data-
packet from the same channel. This is not a challenge in
the intended application as each sampling buffer holds a
complete sample of a specific signal (e.g., turbine tempera-
ture, fuel pressure, etc.), and most recent data is desired for
computation. Similarly, if the transmission rate is lower than
the consumption rate, the consumer reads the same data-
packet multiple times, and this can be handled in software.
4.2 Communication Time Analyzability
In mixed-criticality systems, systems with different levels
of criticality can have different timing characteristics. Based
on its functionality, a system may have different latency
and bandwidth requirements. To accommodate such re-
quirements of different latency and bandwidth in the same
network while preserving time-predictability for all commu-
nications, a concept of dynamic priority is implemented in
the arbitration scheme [4].
Furthermore, communication delay analysis is critical
for scheduling of tasks on an asymmetric architecture. The
release time of a dependent task (that takes input from other
tasks) is influenced by the end-to-end communication delay.
Such end-to-end communication delay can be analyzed
from the transmission schedule, which is again dependent
on task scheduling, creating a deadlock.
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In PaRTAA, the propagation time from a producer to
the transmission-router via an NI, and reception-router to
the destination NI is fixed and equal to 8 clock cycles. The
worst-case latency for a router to router propagation via the
hub for a single packet transmission can be calculated as
Lchannel = (bStotal − 1/Schannel + 1) × tslot + 1 , where,
Lchannel is the worst-case latency in clock cycles, Stotal is the
total number of slots in the arbitration cycle, and Schannel is
the number of slots assigned to a channel.
The worst-case end-to-end communication delay for a
specific channel is driven by the slots assigned to the chan-
nel and the total number of slots present in the arbitration
model, and know before scheduling time.
5 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS
The system development approach for an asymmetric multi-
processor is different from the approach taken in more com-
mon symmetric multiprocessors. In asymmetric multipro-
cessing, tasks are strategically segregated among different
processors based on respective timing requirements. The
robust resource partitioning adds additional complexities
as the tasks need to be segregated in different partitions
under different processors considering partition switching
overheads and inter-task communication delays. Moreover,
apart from WCET, periodicity is crucial for real-time control
applications and different systems may require different
periodicity that should be accommodated by the partition
schedule.
5.1 Timing Analysis
Timing accuracy is critical in airborne systems, and a de-
layed computation is considered as dysfunction. The timing
analysis of a system is more complicated than just analyzing
the WCET of the executable binary, and must be analyzed at
the system level. The response time of a system depends on
the overall timing behavior of individual tasks as well as the
characteristics of the integration, including potential delays
from inter-tasks dependencies, communication delays, and
switching overheads.
5.1.1 WCET of independent tasks
Due to the absence of dynamic delays, the processor fea-
tures a cycle-accurate timing analysis for all tasks. As the
processor consumes one instruction in each cycle and each
instruction interleaves in the processor pipeline for a fixed
number of cycles, the bounded loop longest path execution time
(in cycles) of a given task a, τa, is cycle-accurate, repeatable
and can be calculated from the executable instructions when
executed on a non-partitioned environment (e.g., only one
active partition).
Although a task developed for a single core system does
not have the sense of resource partitioning and can directly
execute within any partition in the proposed architecture,
the partition-scheduling can significantly influence the tim-
ing behavior of the underlying tasks. If a partition P , is
assigned an execution time τp and a periodicity λp, and the
task a is ported in the partition P , then the WCET of task a
in partition P , τpa , can be determined as:
τpa =
(⌈
τa
τp
⌉
− 1
)
× λp +
{
τa −
(⌈
τa
τp
⌉
− 1
)
× τp
}
Note that the partitioning has no effect on the WCET of
the task, when τp > τa. Similarly, if a partition is shared
by multiple tasks say a, b and c, then the WCET time of
individual tasks within the partition τpa , τpb and τpc remains
unchanged as τa, τb, τc when τp > (τa + τb + τc).
5.1.2 WCET of dependent tasks
When a task is dependent on one or multiple tasks and im-
plemented in different partitions under the same or different
processor(s), the scheduling of the partitions can influence
the response time, e.g., when an application is driven by
two tasks a and b, the WCET time of the application can
be affected by the mutual arrangement of the tasks in
partitions. Two tasks can be segregated in three possible
ways; Case 1: the tasks share the same partition, Case 2: the
tasks are implemented in different partitions, but under the
same processor, and Case 3: the tasks are implemented in
different processors.
Case 1: When the tasks are scheduled sequentially within the
same partition, there is no effect on WCET from the partition
schedule, considering that the partition execution budget
is higher than the collective WCET times of the tasks. The
WCET of the application solely depends on the scheduling
of the tasks inside the partition, and in this case τa + τb, as
shown in Figure 5.
Case 2: When the tasks a, b are scheduled at γa, γb time
respectively in two different partitions under the same
processor, the WCET of the application τs is determined as:
τs = (τp1 − γa) + (γb + τp2b ) + δSO
where, τp1 , τp2 are execution budget of the partitions and
δSO is partition switching overhead.
Case 3: When the tasks a, b are scheduled on different
processors, the WCET of the application greatly depends
on mutual scheduling of the partitions in two different
processors. When, the partitions are synchronized, the best
WCET of the application is:
WCETs = (WCETp1a + δCD +WCETp2b )
where, δCD is the worst-case end-to-end communication de-
lay. When there is no synchronization between the partitions
in the processors and assumed to be unknown, the WCET
of the system increases due to unpredictable relative state
of computation in different partitions, and WCET of the
application can be determined as:
WCETs =
(
WCETp1a + τp1 + τp2 + τp3 +WCETp3b − 1
)
Figure 5 shows an example of the three possible distribu-
tions of the tasks a, b and the impact of partition scheduling
on WCET of the resulting functionality.
5.2 Task Synchronization
Dependency in tasks can be mutual, i.e., two tasks α and
β can be inter-dependent. In such cases, synchronization
must be established so that tasks can cooperate. For such
synchronization, the processor features processor flags that
are exposed to all the partitions under all processors, as
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Fig. 5. A timing diagram showing WCET of a system with two sub-
systems a and b under different implementations. Case 1: Both sub-
systems are implemented in the same partition. Case 2: The sub-
systems are implemented in different partitions on the same processor.
Case 3: The sub-systems are implemented in separate processors. δ is
the worst-case end-to-end communication delay.
explained earlier. A task can set the respective processor
flags to some pre-set values as the execution progresses, and
the other task can read the flag values and proceed with its
execution path accordingly.
read_processor_flag_b
send clk to Pb
set_processor_flag_a to m
read_processor_flag_b
set_processor_flag_a to n
clk = read_clock
if (clk - prev_clk >= Ta )
if (processor_flag_b == x)
clk = read_clock
if (processor_flag_b == y)
prev_clk = read_clock
True
True
True
False
False
False
set_processor_flag_b to x
read_processor_flag_a
if (processor_flag_a == m)
msg = read_msg_from_a
clk = read_clock
output = (msg - clk)
read_processor_flag_a
if (processor_flag_a == n)
False
False
True
True
set_processor_flag_b to y
(α) (β)
Fig. 6. Flow diagram showing synchronization between two tasks α and
β scheduled on different processors using processor flags.
Figure 6 demonstrates an example of tasks synchroniza-
tion between the tasks α and β implemented in different
processors. The task β sets associated flag to the value x
when it is ready. Task α reads the flag value and sends data
to β. When the data is sent, α sets its flag to m. β waits until
the transmission is reflected in the flag controlled by α. The
task β reads the data and sets its flag to y to acknowledge
the reception, and the process continues, as illustrated in
Figure 6.
Note that the inter-system communication takes place
over the NoC, where reception is acknowledged using the
processor flags.
5.3 Reliability Analysis
One of the motivations behind the proposed architecture is
to eliminate any single point of failure and to enhance the
reliability of the system. In the past, we have demonstrated
a distributed implementation of a flight controller on an
asymmetric multiprocessor to improve overall reliability
[38].
In [38], the reliability of the NoC is assumed to be
extremely high (reliability 1.0), and also discussed that the
NoC is a single point of failure in such architectures. How-
ever, a shared memory-based communication decreases the
load on the NoC and can potentially prevent complete
system failure while a failure in the NoC is encountered.
Although, in this work, the shared memory does not feature
any hardware-based protection, a software-based protection
mechanism such as mutex can be implemented.
Single or multiple failures in the NI or in the router do
not affect the rest of the network; however, the hub is a
single point of failure in the proposed NoC architecture. The
hub is not reachable by the executing software to modify the
configuration and only susceptible to hardware failures.
Each processor and even each partition can have sepa-
rate memory devices (e.g., SRAM chips) for instruction and
data memory, and thus erroneous operation of a memory
device only affect the associated partition/ processor. For
additional memory protection, a redundant memory devices
with a polling mechanism can be implemented.
Besides, PaRTAA features partition flags and processor
flags that are visible to all other partitions in all processors.
These flags can be strategically used to expose the execution
state in each processor, and the same can be observed by
other systems in other partitions. This is a novel feature for
health monitoring and safety-net mechanism, as well as task
synchronization as it offers better insight over conventional
time-out implementations. The processor flags are memory-
mapped and read-only, writing on these addresses has no
effect, preventing any partition from altering the flags of
other partitions. Lastly, such flags can potentially be used for
communication as well (e.g., condition checks), thus, adding
more to the communication redundancy.
5.4 System Configuration
Each processor has isolated instruction memory, and the
executable binary shall be downloaded to each instruction
memory separately. Similarly, data needed for the execution
shall be uploaded to each data memory of each parti-
tion under each processor individually. This could be a
time-consuming process and may not be ideal for general
purpose applications. However, once prepared, airborne
systems are used for an extensive period of time without
modification, and that can justify the time-consuming con-
figuration of the platform.
6 DEMONSTRATION
In our previous works, [3], [4], we have demonstrated the
timing and performance characteristics of the uniprocessor
architecture and the NoC. Therefore, in this work, we have
focused on demonstrating the feasibility and novelty of the
proposed multiprocessor platform in the context of mixed-
criticality airborne systems.
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6.1 Setup
The proposed architecture is demonstrated on FPGA LEs.
All the hardware is defined in Verilog and synthesized with
Intel Quartus Prime v18.1 tool. For experimentation and
demonstration, we have used Intel Cyclone V SoC board;
however, the hard processor on the SoC is not used. The
hardware platform features a 50 MHz oscillator, which
is used to clock the processors, the NoC, and other co-
processor IPs. No secondary clock or phase-locked loop (PLL)
is used. The FPGA resources utilized to synthesize the
proposed architecture is presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Resource usage in FPGA synthesis.
Hardware components ALMs Combi. ALUTs Registers
Ærø Core 2653 2646 4493
Co-processors 622 707 471
NoC 1862 2123 3647
Total 4137 5476 8611
Ærø without partition 1607 1408 2277
Partition overhead 1046 1223 2216
We did not use any flash memory to store the configu-
ration, and the FPGA needs to be reconfigured after each
power cycle. For direct volatile configuration, the synthe-
sized configuration file (Intel’s proprietary SOF format) is
uploaded via an on-board JTAG connection. The hardware
platform is powered by an external power source, and the
JTAG connection can be removed once the configuration
file is downloaded on the FPGA. A specific GPIO pin is
shorted that forces all four active-partition-flags from four
processors to 00, deactivating execution in all processors.
Instructions for each processor and data for each partition is
downloaded separately with two separate UART connection
(for data and instruction). This process is manual. Once
all the data and instructions are downloaded, the GPIO
pin is released, and a global reset button is pressed to
start execution. The global reset clears all control and data
registers and sets program counters to zero.
6.2 Software Development
The custom ISA used in this work also requires a custom
compiler, which is an extensive work. On the other hand,
writing assembly code is difficult and normally quite time
consuming. Instead of developing an ISA specific compiler,
we have used the standard x86 LLVM clang compiler to
generate assembly code, and we have developed an as-
sembler to modify the x86 assembly to fit our ISA, before
generating binary executables. We do not claim any novelty
of this method in software development for airborne system,
but rather we demonstrate the competence of the proposed
architecture with standard language like 1999 ISO C when
software development tools are made available.
The register-register ISA prevents the use of immediate
and the software development must comply with it. All
the variables and constants must be defined and initialized
before use. This is not a challenge in the intended appli-
cation as the software development guidelines for airborne
systems require definition and initialization of all variables
and constants.
6.3 Avionics Use Case
The avionics use case demonstrates the feasibility of porting
a conventional avionics system onto the proposed architec-
ture as well as its competence towards the requirements
for a mixed-criticality system for airborne platforms. We
have selected four generic avionics systems with different
criticality-levels. The systems, dependencies, and communi-
cation requirements are presented in Table 3.
A flight-director (FD) system, a DAL level A system
(criticality-level 1 in our system), takes input data related
to flight-path and flight data (heading, altitude, attitude, air-
speed etc.) and computes the required maneuvers to achieve
a pre-set flight-path. The output of the FD is displayed as
cues on horizontal-situation-indicator (HSI) on a primary-flight-
display (PFD) to guide the pilot or the autopilot system. An
autopilot system can generate control commands to achieve
reference altitude, heading, and speed based on inputs from
an FD or a pilot. An engine-indicating-system (EIS) displays
the performance and health characteristics of the propulsion
system on the electronic-flight-instrument-system (EFIS) for
crew awareness. Lastly, a moving-map system displays the
aircraft’s position on a variety of stored maps for crew
awareness.
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Fig. 7. The avionics use case demonstration setup. The host system is
a Linux platform that is connected to the FPGA experimental platform
with a UART communication port.
For demonstration, we have developed each system
using model-based-development (MBD) technique with MATH-
WORKS Simulink, where a mathematical/ logical model of
the system is defined by the designer, and later C code is
automatically generated from the model by the embedded
code generator featured on Simulink tool. MBD is a well-
adopted development technique in the aerospace industry,
and the development process can potentially qualify DO-
178B/C [5], [7] requirements when the guidelines are fol-
lowed.
To simulate the dynamics of the airborne platform and
generate required data sources to evaluate the execution of
the systems, we have used X-Plane 11 Flight Simulator, a
matured and well-adopted flight simulator used in several
pilot training programs. The X-Plane 11 simulator executes
on a host system (generic Linux platform) and features
I/O interfacing (simulated sensor readings and control com-
mands) over UDP. To establish communication between the
simulator and the processor platform synthesized on the
FPGA, we have used an interface software that converts UDP
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TABLE 3
Implemented systems with different criticality-levels and dependencies.
System Criticality Dependency Signal Processor Partition System WCET Partition WCET
τ (ms) (ms)
Flight Director 1 None N/A 1 1 1.127 2
EIS 1 Autopilot Throttle command 2 1 0.527 1
Moving Map 3 None N/A 2 3 0.319 1
Autopilot System 2 FD
Pitch Cue, Roll Cue
1 2 1.761 2
Speed (IAS), Ref Speed
packets from the simulator to UART and vice versa and
features a UART communication port to interface with the
FPGA platform. The demonstration setup is presented in
Figure 7. Further, to visualize the computational outputs
from the executing systems, we used an application to sim-
ulate an electronic flight instrument system (EFIS), as shown
in Figure 8. Note that the multi-functional display (MFD)
application works as a widget-based cockpit display system
as defined in ARINC-661 [39], where only the widgets are
driven by the input signals from the FPGA (via interface
software), and graphics are driven by the host system.
38.038.0
389389
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Fig. 8. A screenshot of an Electronic Flight Instrument System simula-
tion with an Horizental Situation Indicator application on the left, moving-
map application on top-right and EIS application on bottom-right.
On the FPGA platform, a custom UART IP core re-
ceives the UART packets from the interfacing application
and stores different signal values in separate sampling
buffers, thus, preventing the received packets from being
overwritten before consumption. This feature is essential to
guarantee the availability of the received data packet for the
correct consumer that may not have execution access at the
time of the reception of the packet, which could be otherwise
overwritten by another data-packet from a different signal
or consumed by another system under partition with execu-
tion access. Such a sampling port-based UART is justifiable
in this system as it mimics the behavior of an avionics-data-
concentrator unit used in an avionics system that provides
isolation between data samples of different signals.
For demonstration, we have mapped the applications in
different partitions and processors based on its criticality-
levels, as presented in Table 3. The FD system receives input
signals from the simulator via UART sampling ports. For
computational purpose, the FD uses only the protected data
memory allocated to the partition. The output signals from
the FD is sent to the MFD application via UART, and the
output data is written to the shared memory associated
with the processor. The autopilot system and the FD shares
the same processor but executes in different partitions. The
autopilot system reads the FD cues from the shared memory
and uses protected memory for computation. The output is
sent to the X-Plane simulator via UART. The EIS system is
placed on a different processor and receives inputs from
the simulator via UART, and from the autopilot system
via the NoC. When the autopilot is engaged, the EIS reads
the throttle command signal from NoC. The engagement/
disengagement of the autopilot is controlled by a processor
flag. The computed output signals are sent to the MFD ap-
plication using the UART port. The moving map application
is independent. The WCET of each system and partition is
presented in Table 3.
A dysfunction/ failure in the FD system directly affects
the autopilot system due to its dependency on the FD
output signals, irrespective of the communication medium.
However, this has no effect on the systems independent of
the FD system e.g., EIS and Moving map. A dysfunction
in the autopilot system (DAL B) may corrupt the shared
memory, which has no effect on the FD system (DAL A), as
the FD system only writes data to the shared memory. The
NoC is not a single point of failure in this architecture as
a failure in the NoC does not affect the functionality of the
FD and the autopilot system in spite of having inter-system
dependencies.
6.4 Comparison and Limitations
In the conventional way, the applications can be imple-
mented in a mixed-criticality system with support from a
hypervisor for establishing isolation between the applica-
tions with different criticality-levels. However, mapping the
applications on PaRTAA does not require a hypervisor or
host software support for establishing isolation, essential for
mixed-criticality implementation. The ARINC 653 partition
environment on a uniprocessor can accommodate multiple
applications of the same criticality-level in the same parti-
tion; however only one application can execute at a time.
Similarly, when applications are segregated on different
processors on a single core equivalent multicore system,
only a single application of a criticality-level gets execution
access. In contrast, the proposed architecture enables the
simultaneous execution of multiple applications of the same
criticality-level. An example of potential mapping of ARINC
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Fig. 9. Mapping of ARINC 653 partitions on the proposed architecture
without any hypervisor.
653 partitions on the proposed architecture is illustrated
in Figure 9. Applications with high dependency can be
implemented on the same processor (either on the same
partition or different partition depending on the criticality-
level), and data can be shared using either shared memory
or using the NoC or both (for redundancy), e.g., the flight
director and autopilot application share the same processor
in the demonstration setup, which enhances the system
reliability by removing a single point of failure.
Unlike asymmetric multicore or many-core architectures,
where each system is mapped to a separate processor, this
architecture features a more resource-efficient approach by
allowing systems with different criticality-levels to share a
processor while preserving isolation. Such implementation
avails shared memory for data sharing and reduces the
bandwidth requirement of inter-processor communication
mechanism, such as a NoC. On the other hand, the number
of partitions in each processor is not largely scalable as only
one partition gets execution access at any point of time, and
increment in the number of partitions linearly decreases the
periodicity of other partitions. However, there are only five
levels of criticality defined for airborne systems, and level
E systems are not implemented with other critical systems,
which limits the requirement of partition to 4. However, the
number of processor in the proposed architecture is scalable,
and multiprocessor platform with more processors can be
fabricated.
The second limitation comes from the IO interfacing as
IOs are not synchronized with software execution. A data-
packet can arrive at the destination when the consumer
system may not have execution access. The received data-
packet may get overwritten by another packet before the
intended system gets access to execute, which limits the use
of FIFO based and shared buffer system for IO interfacing,
and all individual IOs shall have dedicated sampling buffer.
However, data-concentrator based avionics communication
features sampling ports for data-protection and isolation.
There is no specific requirement or constraint on the data or
instruction memory interfaced with PaRTAA. However, the
limited number of available GPIOs on the physical chip can
be the bottleneck for interfacing large memory devices.
Lastly, the system scheduling on this architecture is
complex as compared to single-core or symmetric-multicore
scheduling due to the additional complexity of partition
scheduling. Each system has its own WCET and executes
under a partition that has a direct influence on the WCET.
For optimal scheduling problem, WCET of each system,
communication delay between systems as well as partition
execution times shall be taken under consideration.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The hardware-based isolation for mixed-criticality systems
must enforce isolation in the temporal or the spatial do-
main to prevent interference between systems and of-
ten achieved with a large number of isolated processors
that typically results in under-utilized hardware resources.
The proposed multiprocessor architecture features coarse
granularity within each processor for better utilization of
resources while preserving isolation between partitions.
Systems with intense inter-system communication require-
ments can share the same processor where shared memory
can be used for data sharing, while systems with lower
inter-system communication needs can be implemented on
separate processors and communicate over the NoC.
The proposed architecture unveils interesting and new
scheduling challenges. Although we have successfully
scheduled multiple avionics applications for experimenta-
tion and evaluation purposes, the scope of optimal partition
scheduling, along with task scheduling within each parti-
tion remains unaddressed. Furthermore, the work can be
investigated for reliability analysis, where the system can
preserve critical functionality in the event of one or more
subsystem failure.
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